Washington, Jan 25 (IANS) The United States has made clear that its allies must shoulder a greater share of global defence responsibilities as Washington refocuses its military priorities on defending the homeland and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, according to the 2026 National Defense Strategy.
The strategy states that while America’s alliances remain essential, they can no longer function on the basis of dependency. “Our allies will do so not as a favor to us, but out of their own interests,” the document says, adding that partners must act as contributors rather than “dependencies of the last generation.”
As the United States prioritizes homeland defence and the Indo-Pacific, the strategy says other threats will persist across regions, making allied participation critical. It stresses that allies must take the lead in addressing security challenges that are “less severe for us but more so for them,” with the United States providing “critical but more limited support.”
A central concern outlined in the strategy is what it describes as the “simultaneity problem”—the risk that multiple adversaries could act together or opportunistically across different theaters. The document says this risk has been heightened by decades of underinvestment by allies in their own defences, leaving the United States to subsidize security while others focused on domestic priorities.
“For too long, allies and partners have been content to let us subsidize their defence,” the strategy states, adding that regular Americans “paid the bill” while political leaders reaped the credit. It says that approach is now over, describing burden-sharing as an “essential ingredient” of the new strategy.
The document highlights a new global benchmark for defense spending set under President Donald Trump’s leadership. It calls for allies to spend 3.5 per cent of gross domestic product on core military capabilities and an additional 1.5 per cent on security-related spending, for a total of 5 per cent of GDP. The strategy says this standard should apply “around the world, not just in Europe.”
In Europe, the strategy states that NATO allies are well-positioned to take primary responsibility for their own conventional defence, citing their combined economic strength and industrial capacity. It says European allies must take the lead against threats that are more severe for them, including responsibility for supporting Ukraine’s defence, while the United States calibrates its force posture accordingly.
“Europe taking primary responsibility for its own conventional defense is the answer to the security threats it faces,” the document says, adding that US engagement will continue but with a sharper focus on priorities elsewhere.
In the Indo-Pacific, the strategy emphasises that allies and partners share an interest in a “free and open regional order” and must play a vital role in deterring and balancing China. Their contributions, it says, are essential to reinforcing deterrence and maintaining a favorable balance of power in the region.
The strategy also outlines expectations for burden-sharing beyond Europe and Asia. In the Middle East, it says regional partners must take greater responsibility for deterring Iran and its proxies, with US support remaining focused and decisive. On the Korean Peninsula, it states that South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea, supported by US forces in a more limited role.
It says incentives will favor “model allies” that meet spending commitments and visibly contribute to regional security. Cooperation, it says, will be prioritized through arms sales, defense industrial collaboration, intelligence-sharing, and operational planning.
The strategy argues that effective burden-sharing strengthens deterrence globally by enabling allied networks to generate sufficient forces even in the event of simultaneous crises.
