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Abdul Wahid Nour: Burhan and Hemedti have no right to rule in military uniform

© Provided by The Rahnuma Daily

RAHNUMA KHARTOUM: Abdul Wahid Nour, the head of the Sudan Liberation Movement and Army, rejected the participation of the army commander Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”, in any future government in their military capacities, stipulating that anyone who wants to engage in political work must give up their military status and uniform and resort to elections.

Abdul Wahid Nour confirmed in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat that his movement will not side with either party in the war, and will not participate in a settlement that would bring Islamists back to power, calling for the building of a new national army to which all forces, including his movement’s forces, would be subject, according to unified standards.

Abdul Wahid Nur is considered one of the most prominent leaders of the movements that took up arms in Darfur in 2003 to protest the marginalization of the region. He rejected the 2006 Abuja Agreement, which was signed by the regime of former President Omar Al-Bashir with a faction of his movement led by Minni Arko Minawi.

Politics after the uniform

Al-Nur linked his stance on Burhan and Hemedti to the demands of the December 2018 revolution, emphasizing that the future of governance must be civilian and that military ownership does not grant its leaders the right to political participation. He stated, “Anyone who wants to establish a party or present a project to the Sudanese people can do so after leaving the military establishment, with the final decision resting with the voters.”

followed by the formation of a transitional authority with civilian and military participation. However, the October 2021 coup led by Burhan and Hemedti derailed the civilian transition, before the outbreak of war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces in April 2023, stemming from a power struggle and disagreements over the integration of forces.

Al-Nur emphasized that his movement is not fighting alongside either side. Regarding talk of understandings with the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur, he expressed his welcome for any understanding that prevents confrontation, without confirming the existence of an agreement or specifying its contents, stressing that his movement will defend itself if attacked by any party.

He explained that the presence of his forces in Jebel Marra, the stronghold of his movement in Darfur, predates the current war, and that they have maintained their positions despite confrontations with the army, the Janjaweed, militias, and splinter groups.

He warned of the war’s repercussions spreading to neighboring countries and rejected the partition of Sudan, arguing that preserving its unity requires addressing the root causes that drive some of its constituent groups to demand self-determination or secession. He cited the secession of South Sudan in 2011, warning against a repeat of that experience if the underlying causes of the conflict remain unaddressed.

Nour called for a meeting to address issues of identity, the relationship between religion and the state, the monopoly of power, as well as the management of diversity, resources, and the form of government. He stated, “Equal citizenship and the rule of law are the guarantees of unity,” emphasizing that political differences should be resolved through elections and parliament.

Nour stated that his movement concluded, after the outbreak of war in 2023, that neutrality alone was insufficient. Therefore, in October 2023, it launched an initiative inviting political parties, armed struggle movements, civil society organizations, community leaders, and national figures to join it. The initiative aimed to halt and end the war, confront hate speech, and restore the democratic transition to civilian rule. Later, the movement shifted its focus to forming a united front of civilian forces opposed to the war and unaligned with either side, with the goal of reviving the December Revolution and its objectives. The movement proposed criteria for the representation of youth, women, resistance committees, civil society, local administrations, and national figures.

Secularism disagreement

Al-Nur recounted a disagreement regarding secularism, noting that the Umma Party agrees with the principle of secularism but has reservations about the terminology. He indicated that a committee, chaired by former transitional Prime Minister Dr. Abdalla Hamdok, had been formed and had contacted Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, regarding a draft that would separate religion from the state. He added that the Umma Party requested a text conveying the same meaning but without using the terminology associated with secularism, and was given two weeks to consult within its institutions.

He said that the split within the “Progress” movement and the emergence of “Sumud” and then “Ta’sis” followed those deliberations. “Progress,” a coalition of civilian forces led by Hamdok, had split in February 2025 due to disagreements over the formation of a parallel government. Those opposed to this option announced the “Sumud” alliance, also led by Hamdok. Al-Nur emphasized that his movement would not continue with the initiative if it deviated from the goal of restoring the December Revolution and establishing civilian rule, stressing his refusal to join the Islamists by saying, “We will not join the Kizan.” “Kizan” is a common Sudanese term used to refer to the Islamist movement, particularly those associated with the regime of Al-Bashir, who ruled the country from the 1989 coup until his overthrow in 2019.

Al-Nur called for the dissolution of the existing army and the building of a new national army after the cessation of hostilities, with all forces, including those of his movement, subject to unified standards.

He said: “The army does not rule; the army is one of the state’s institutions,” considering that its restructuring should end the monopoly of its leadership and its interference in power, and limit its mission to protecting the land, the people, and the constitution.

His call was based on what he described as the continued existence of the structure inherited from colonialism, accusing specific elites of controlling the leadership and using the military establishment to suppress the demands of other regions.

Al-Nur accused the army of committing crimes in South Sudan, Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains, and Darfur, using chemical weapons, citing a 2016 Amnesty International report on Jebel Marra. The organization had stated that it had gathered evidence suggesting the use of chemical weapons against civilians, while the Sudanese government at the time denied these findings and rejected the evidence upon which the report was based.

Al-Nur described the existing army as “the largest militia,” and considered it affiliated with the Islamists, calling for the building of a military institution that represents the nationalities and regions of Sudan, according to clear conditions for service, officer training, and leadership formation; and he stressed that his movement’s forces would not be excluded from this process.

Accounting within the movement

In response to accusations of human rights abuses against members of the movement, Nur stated that leaving was free for those who wished, while those remaining were subject to the movement’s regulations and military law. He emphasized that accountability extended to the leadership, including himself, and that the movement had judicial institutions. He accused some who had left the movement of using these accusations to justify their defection to the regime they had rebelled against, declaring his readiness to appear before an international court or the courts of a country that respects the rule of law. He stated that he was currently in Kenya and prepared to appear before its courts should a case be brought against him.

He rejected the notion that the movement was solely about him, stating, “The Sudan Liberation Movement is not just Abdul Wahid’s personal property,” and emphasizing that it could elect another leader. However, his response did not provide details regarding the fate of the members implicated in the accusations.

Regarding the situation of civilians, he stated that the areas under the movement’s control in Jebel Marra (West Darfur) are hosting, according to his estimates, more than seven million Sudanese. He added that his forces provide them with security, but lack the necessary resources to provide food, water, and shelter. He called on organizations to assist them and on journalists to visit the region. He also rejected classifying his movement as one of the “Darfur movements,” arguing that its project concerns all of Sudan, and that confining forces from the regions to local demands deprives them of participating in shaping national policies.

Negotiate terms

Al-Nur denied refusing negotiations in principle, explaining that his movement had negotiated with the Bashir regime in two rounds in Abeche, Chad, in 2003, and then participated in seven rounds in Abuja, Nigeria, between 2004 and 2006. The Abuja negotiations culminated in an agreement in May 2006, signed by the Minni Minnawi faction, while Al-Nur’s faction and the Justice and Equality Movement rejected it because it did not meet their political and security demands. Al-Nur said that this experience led him to refuse to return to negotiations with the regime, after concluding that it sought to co-opt its opponents with positions and money, not to achieve peace. He added, “A revolution can never be part of the regime.” He then cited his rejection of alliances, the movement’s cooperation with the Justice and Equality Movement, and its participation in the National Democratic Alliance, the Revolutionary Front, the New Dawn movement, and the 2014 Paris Declaration.

He attributed her departure from the Revolutionary Front, which brought together armed movements opposed to Al-Bashir, to its transformation, in his estimation, from a front to overthrow the regime to a negotiating front seeking a “soft landing” through the “Sudan Call,” in reference to reaching a settlement with the regime instead of overthrowing it.

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